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This thesis investigates the relationship between a firm’s corporate social responsibility 
performance (CSR) and its financial performance in a European context. In order to evaluate 
this relationship, CSR performance is estimated through companies’ ESG scores, while 
financial performance is represented by the Return on Assets and Return on Equity Ratios, and 
Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for firm value. Evidence is found that CSR performance and firm 
financial performance/value are positively correlated. However, the direction of causality is left 
to be determined. The findings suggest as well that top performers in CSR have higher returns 
than their peers with a lower CSR performance. Notwithstanding, no evidence is found that 
firms with the worst CSR performance are linked with worse financial results. Finally, the 
results indicate that the three pillars of ESG (Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance) 
have different significant relationships with firm value and financial performance. 
Environmental performance depicts a negative correlation with firm value and financial results, 
while Social and Corporate Governance performance are positively linked with the corporate 
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A presente tese investiga a relação entre o desempenho em termos de responsabilidade social 
corporativa (RSC) de uma empresa e o desempenho financeiro da mesma num contexto 
Europeu. Para avaliar esta relação, o desempenho em RSC é estimado por meio das pontuações 
ESG das empresas, o desempenho financeiro é representado pelos índices de Retorno sobre 
Ativos e de Retorno sobre Capital Próprio, e o rácio de Tobin’s Q é usado como um proxy para 
o valor da empresa. Há evidências de que o desempenho em RSC e o desempenho/valor 
financeiro das empresas estão positivamente correlacionados. No entanto, a direção da 
causalidade é deixada por ser determinada. Os resultados sugerem ainda que as empresas com 
melhores desempenhos em RSC estão positivamente associadas a retornos mais elevados do 
que os seus pares com um desempenho em RSC menor. Não obstante, nenhuma evidência é 
encontrada de que empresas com o pior desempenho em RSE estão ligadas a resultados 
financeiros piores. Por fim, os resultados indicam que os três pilares de ESG (Ambiental, Social 
e Governança Corporativa) têm diferentes relações significativas com o valor da empresa e com 
o desempenho financeiro. O desempenho ambiental apresenta uma correlação negativa com o 
valor da empresa e com resultados financeiros, enquanto o desempenho da Governança 
Corporativa e Social está positivamente ligado aos indicadores de desempenho financeiro 
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Nowadays, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a broad concept, but the idea goes back 
to the 1950’s, when Howard R. Bowen first suggested in his book “Social responsibilities of 
the businessmen” that managers have a moral obligation to make decisions and act in ways that 
are desirable to the overall society (Bowen, 1953). Since then, the topic of Corporate Social 
Responsibility has become a relevant element of the business world. Companies no longer had 
the sole objective of profitability but were now expected to expand their goals to match those 
of their stakeholders and contribute to society as a whole. Stakeholder management, therefore, 
had become a crucial part of a company’s strategy (Freeman 1984) and, as a result, CSR 
activities started to be implemented in order to appease to the interests of the various 
stakeholders.  
According to Carroll (2015), the origin of CSR lies in the post-World War II period. The idea 
developed alongside with the emergence of social movements like the civil and women’s rights 
as well as consumer and environmental shifts. The shift towards a more socially responsible 
mindset was caused by the rising expectations of a larger set of stakeholders, especially the 
consumers and the employees (Carroll, 2015). 
In 1979, Archie B. Carroll described CSR as follows: 
“The social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time.” 
 
On the basis of this definition, the Corporate Social Responsibility pyramid, depicted in Figure 
1, was later developed by Carroll in 1991, in which economical responsibility corresponds to 
the base of the pyramid, followed by legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities.  
By the 1990s, the concept of CSR included a much broader group of topics and ideas, such as 








Figure 1 Carroll's Pyramid 
 
Due to the wide range of Corporate Social Responsibility definitions, the perception and idea 
of CSR varies significantly among companies, managers and in society (Lau et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, there is some consensus in the CSR literature about its core definition. One 
common argument behind CSR is that instead of focusing the companies’ resources on 
maximizing profits and the wealth of shareholders, managers should focus direct their focus on 
improving stakeholders’ welfare (Becchetti et al., 2011). Another consensus reached on the 
theme of CSR are the three key areas on which all CSR activities are based. Those are the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) aspects, and they are known in the literature as 
the three pillars of sustainability (Staub-Bisnang, 2012). 
It is the objective of this thesis to analyze and understand the impact of CSR performance on 
European firms between the years of 2002 and 2017. In order to do so, a series of regressions 
will be conducted to estimate this effect. The paper has the following structure. First, CSR will 
be defined as the underlying concept of ESG. Second, the theoretical framework is presented. 
The subsequent section describes the data and the methodology applied for the empirical 
analysis. Finally, the empirical findings will be examined, on which the main conclusions of 


















1.1. CSR and financial performance 
 
The relationship between CSR and profitability has, since the first work of Bowen in 1953, 
become a major topic of interest. As a result, the mindset of managers and shareholders has 
changed over the past decades, as we are now seeing an increasing number of organizations 
making CSR activities a priority in their agenda (Maretno H. et al. 2016) and implementing 
them in their strategies, using their own resources to boost or correct their social and 
environmental impact, while improving the communities around them. Changes in customer 
expectations and climate change concerns have become important strategic influences 
(Prahalad C. K. et al. 1994). 
This recent development of CSR ideals has raised the question to managers worldwide if 
improving or not the performance in CSR activities pays off for firms in the long term, that is, 
whether the use of company resources to address social, environmental and governmental issues 
can create synergies to increase firm value as well as improve financial performance, ultimately 
benefiting the company and its shareholders. 
Today, companies may engage in socially responsible activities in many forms such as the 
following: employing and training minorities, improving their ecology efficiency, respecting 
human rights, among many others (Carroll, 2008). As CSR commitment can be costly and 
requires that companies spend their limited resources that could otherwise be invested in other, 
more profitable, projects (Maretno H. et al. 2016), managers must know if such ventures will 
be valuable or not in order for investment in these areas to occur (Kurucz et al., 2008). 
“Sustainability is becoming more important for all companies, across all industries. 
62% of executives consider a sustainability strategy necessary to be competitive today, and 
another 22% think it will be in the future.” (Knut H., 2016) 
 
As more and more managers perceive CSR as a way to get ahead of competition, companies 
have begun to develop their business strategies around CSR and managed indeed to create a 
competitive edge (Carroll, 2008) due to their socially responsible performance. It is reasonable 
to assume that most companies engage in CSR activities due to the potential gains that they can 
reap from it, in lieu of more altruist reasons. Notwithstanding the reasons behind CSR 
investment, society, as much as the company, has a lot to gain from such ventures. Regarding 
the benefits companies are able to generate from being socially responsible and engaging in 




and keeping them motivated, the companies’ products and services become more marketable 
as costumers perceive them as more ethical and sustainable, and therefore as a better choice, 
and finally, it can be ultimately a source of competitive advantage (Barnett et al 2006). Other 
benefits of pursuing a sustainability strategy include a positive effect on firm reputation and 
image, cost savings and higher (Weber 2008). 
1.2. Corporate Social Responsibility in Europe 
 
Although the first ideas of Corporate Social Responsibility emerged in the United States, the 
concept is very present in the minds of the Europeans as well. CSR in Europe, and particularly 
in the European Union, is seen as “a voluntary and self-regulatory program” to be conducted 
by the companies themselves. Nonetheless, the European Commission has discussed and 
released over the past years several tools and guidelines to foster CSR growth and sustainable 
development in Europe. For the European Commission, CSR is defined as “actions by 
companies over and above their legal obligations towards society and the environment” 
(European Commission, 2011).  
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility first appeared on the European Union agenda 
in 2001, in a Green Paper where the term was introduced. Since then, an ongoing debate about 
the topic has assured an increase in acceptance and compliance of CSR ideals in Europe 
(European Union, 2014). In the past years, more and more European companies have pursued 
projects designed to improve environmental and social sustainability and year by year, 
companies have been publishing an increased number of CSR/Sustainability reports (Nielsen 
et al., 2013). For these results and the drive that CSR has gained in recent years have contributed 
several European and international tools such as the ISO 9000, the United Nations Global 
Compact, the EFQM Framework for CSR, the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on Social 
Responsibility, the Global Reporting Initiative and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises. 
Although the quick and swift rise of CSR investment in Europe, there is still much progress to 
be achieved. Despite the rising importance of implementing CSR activities in corporate 
strategy, the main goal of shareholders is still to increase their wealth. Therefore, there is still a 
challenge for European firms to find and create synergies between value creation and CSR 
implementation. Another problem faced is in the diffusion of information. Making shareholders 
aware that they can use CSR activities as a mechanism to gain a competitive advantage over 




1.3 The ESG Framework 
 
There are many forms to quantify Corporate Social Responsibility performance, however, for 
the purpose of this study, it is of the most importance that the all data can be comparable across 
companies and countries and that it is assessed from an independent third party. As such, all 
data concerning CSR performance indicators is retrieved from an individual independent 
source: Thomson Reuters’ DataStream ESG Scores. 
The scores provided by Thomson Reuters are computed from over 400 company-level ESG 
measures retrieved from the companies’ public sources and from other origins such as news 
reports. These measures are then classified into 10 different categories and finally congregated 
into the three major categories of ESG: Environmental performance, Social performance and 
Corporate Governance performance. The three pillars and the 10 categories that compose them 




Based on the assessment of each pillar, the overall ESG score is calculated through a weighted 
average of the 10 categories (see Table 1), which reflects a company’s CSR effectiveness and 
performance on the three pillars. The ESG Score ranges from 0 to 1 (or 0 to 100), in which 0 
corresponds to lowest possible score and to the letter grade “D-” and 1 to the highest possible 






















2. Literature Review 
 
Throughout the past years, there has been a growing concern for environmental, social and 
governance issues and, consequently, the role of firms on these topics has been one of the main 
questions to arise on the mind of the academics. Since organizations have started to have a more 
prominent role on these issues, researchers have studied what is the impact, if any, of CSR on 
a firm’s financial performance.  
Many argue that companies should just focus on increasing their value and distributing profit 
to their shareholders pockets, that “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” 
(Friedman 1970). However, through the last decades, as social consciousness increases, and the 
paradigm changes, it is now more widely accepted that managers and organizations have the 
moral obligation to make decisions that are desirable to the overall society (Bowen 1953). As 
these two concepts, profits and social awareness, are not completely contradictory, some 
authors believe that while engaging in CSR activities a firm could increase its profits and value. 
Although many studies have surfaced around the topic, there seems to be little consensus about 
the impact of CSR on corporate firm performance. Some argue that the relationship is 
conclusively positive (Bird et al. 2007; Waddock and Graves 1997; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Jiao 
2010; Eccles et al. 2013), due to many different factors such as increased company reputation 
(Brown et al. 1997), or due to decreases in costs associated with lawsuits (Dhaliwal et al. 2011) 
among many other reasons such as a boost in customer loyalty (Brown et al. 2006). The 
European Commission finds several benefits companies have to gain in the implementation of 
CSR activities such as improvement in productivity and employee motivation, company 
reputation and customer satisfaction and enhancement of its relations with the local community 
(European Commission, 2009). 
Other studies have found a negative relationship between CSR and performance indicators 
(Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2001; Friedman 1970; Barnea et al. 2010; Groening et al. 2013) since, 
for example, firms may use valuable limited resources in CSR activities that could have been 
used to invest in profitable projects, lessening the potential value of the firm (Barnea et al. 
2010). There are authors who have found no relationship at all between social and financial 
performance (Hillman and Kein 2001; Aupperle et al. 1985) and, finally, there are some who 
have found a mixed relationship between corporate social responsibility and financial 




Another question past researchers have tried to answer is what the impact of each dimension of 
CSR is (Environmental, Social and Governance) on a company’s performance/value. The 
existing literature suggests that the most impactful pillars on firm performance are the 
environmental and the governance ones. Firms with outstanding performance on these two 
categories generate positive results (Dimson et al. 2013; Klassen et al., 1996) and its valuations 
will be positively influenced (Bird et al. 2007; Dowell et al., 2000). Nonetheless, there is some 
disagreement regarding the environmental pillar. There are authors that agree that investment 
in environmental efficiency can be too costly and hurts productivity (Gray et al., 1993) leading 
to lower market values. 
On the whole, favorable governance practices and positive employee relations are seen as key 
components that lead to positive returns (Edmans 2008; Bertrand et al. 2003). 
The social pillar has been gaining track in the past years. A trend has been emerging as 
companies have started to become more involved in their local communities, contributing to 
the improvement of society with their products and services, providing money and time to social 
causes (Grant, 2014). Socially responsibility is now seen has a necessary element of corporate 
strategy. Managers know that the goodwill created by these types of activities is extremely 
beneficial (Brown et al. 2006; Jensen 2002).  
One of the reasons that may explain the lack of consensus in the literature could be the many 
forms researchers have tried to approach this problem. Some papers have tried the accounting-
based approach, using CSR scores as proxies for social performance and measures such as 
ROA, ROE and ROS to account for the firm’s financial performance while others perform an 
event studies, using company announcements and news reports related to social and 
environmental issues to evaluate and quantify corporate social performance instead of 
analyzing CSR scores. Regarding this type of studies, conclusions are drawn that investors react 
positively to good company environmental behaviors whilst reacting negatively to news and 
announcements regarding harmful environmental practices in the United States (Flammer 
2013).  
An important aspect of the past literature is that the results seem to vary when studying different 
countries and industry sectors. As such, this research will be focused on the European 
environment, investigating how the European companies perform in all CSR dimensions and 








This research is based on a sample of 250 listed companies, from the following 15 European 
countries: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Austria, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Sweden. This sample 
includes yearly data between the years of 2002 and 2017 available on Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. 
Although this thesis’s intention is to investigate the effect of CSR on the whole European 
continent, data from only 15 countries was collected. Several countries were excluded due to 
a) for several countries, in particular the eastern European countries such as Poland, Ukraine, 
Russia or Turkey, data for the ESG scores is only available from 2008 onwards and b) some 




All the variables (dependent, independent and control variables) are retrieved or computed from 
data obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Datastream is a reliable and trustworthy 
database widely used in the academic field, as such it is expected that all the data used is reliable 
and truthful. Table 2 describes all the variables employed in this research. 
Dependent Variables  
The dependent variables used in the regressions described below, follow the same approach of 
studies researching the relationship between CSR and corporate financial performance done in 
the past (Waddock et al., 1997; Derwall, 2007). The dependent variables used are Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), in order to assess operational performance, 
companies’ profitability and overall financial performance. 
As a proxy for firm value, Tobins’ Q1 was the chosen variable as is the most commonly used 
in previous studies as well (Derwall, 2007; Mackey et al., 2007). 
 
                                                          
1 Tobin’s Q is computed as follows: Tobin’s Q = 







The independent variables used for this research are the firms’ total ESG scores and the 
individual scores of the components that constitute the ESG score, which evaluates a firm’s 
corporate social responsibility in the three pillars of sustainability, environmental, social and 
governance over a year. ESG Scores are graded between 0 and 100, as 100 being the highest 
possible score a company can achieve. 
The ESG Score is an equally weighted average of the three pillars’ scores. For this research, 
the pillars’ individual scores will also be used to observe their individual impact. These are to 
be denominated as Environmental Score, Social Score and Governance Score. 
Dummy variables are required as well to assess the financial impact of the top and bottom CSR 
performers. HighESGscore will take the value 1 for ESG scores above 90 and 0 otherwise, 
while LowESGscore will take the value 1 when the ESG scores are below 20 and 0 for values 
equal or above 21. These values were chosen as to take into account only the extremely high 
and low scores, in order to capture a group sample that is significant enough (Derwall, 2007). 
These variables are needed to assess the total and individual impact of ESG on financial 
performance. 
Control Variables 
As there are other factors that may influence firm performance, such as firm size and risk 
(Waddock et al. 1997), this study includes control variables in its regressions. Size is an 
important factor that influences value and performance, as such, the log of Total Assets and the 
log of Total Sales will be used as a proxy to control for firm size (Derwall, 2007; Waddock et 
al., 1997). 
Risk tolerance is another factor that must be accounted for as not to bias the results. Risk taken 
by the firm influences vastly its performance, therefore a Debt/Assets ratio will be used as a 
control variable as well (Waddock et al., 1997). 
As for the Tobin’s Q, the variables logarithm of the Book Value of Assets, Sales growth and 
Return on Assets will be used as control variables (Derwall, 2007; Waddock et al., 1997). 
Previous studies have found that all these variables have a positive impact on firm value (Q) 
and should be included as control variables. Sales growth usually represent higher levels of 
investment from the firms, implying that the firm is growing. The other two control variables 






This study investigates the relationship between the variables over the years in form of a panel 
data study. All regressions employed on this paper are run using the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method. 
In order to research the link between Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial 
Performance/Firm value, a three-step approach will be employed. The first set of three 
regressions will estimate, individually, Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and 
Tobin’s Q (Q) against the firms Total ESG Score (ESGscore). A set of control variables is used 
to control for the various factors described in the Variables part of this paper. 
Regression 1: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
These first regressions will demonstrate the type of relationship between ESG and financial 
performance/value and the size of its impact, whether it be positive, negative, mixed or simply 
if there is no relationship at all. 
The second set of regressions will use the dummy variables HighESGscore and LowESGscore 
to study the relationship between high and low ESG Scores and, again, the financial 
performance/firm value variables. This will be useful to provide more information about the 
financial performance of top and the worse CSR performers (Derwall, 2007). Top performers 
are considered those whose ESG Score is above 80 and the laggards are the companies who 




𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 






Finally, the last three regressions will run the three pillars of ESG (EnvironmentalScore, 
SocialScore and GovernanceScore) against the dependent variables ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, 
to study their individual impact on the companies’ financial performance. 
Regression 3: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
From the findings of these three regressions, conclusions can be drawn about which activities 
from the three categories of ESG are the most advantageous for companies to undertake. This 
will provide a deeper input of how firms’ financials behave with the performance of each pillar. 
A fixed effects model is employed on all regressions. Year fixed effects and Country fixed 
effects are also employed as to control for any variation that is attributed to time and country 















4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for all the variables employed in this study are outlined in Table 3. 
The descriptive statistics summarize the data obtained on a total of 250 companies, among 15 
European countries throughout 15 years, from 2002 to 2017. In order to achieve the results 
displayed in Table 3, the extreme 1% values were winsorized from the original sample. 
Regarding the dependent variables, that is, Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) 
and Tobin’s Q, it can be concluded that, on average, the total 250 listed European firms in this 
sample, have a Return of Assets of 6.08%, a Return on Equity of 13.52% and a Tobin’s Q of 
0.91. Concerning the independent variables, that is, the overall ESG score, and the individual 
scores for environmental, social and governance performance, it can be inferred that the 
companies’ ESG Score in this dataset ranges from 16.74 to 96.23, with an average score of 
62.44. In regards for the individual pillars, on average, the firms have an Environmental score 
of 74.87, a Social score of 75.52 and a Corporate Governance Score of 59.86. Finally, regarding 
the control variables, the corporations in this dataset have on average, a logarithm of Sales of 
15.54, a yearly Sales Growth of 16.76%, a logarithm of the Book Value of Assets of 16.13 and 
a ratio of Debt on Total Assets of 0.27. 
Regarding the overall ESG Score for each country, Figure 3 depicts the evolution throughout 
the past 16 years. Every single country shows an upward trend, which corroborates the theory 
that companies are investing more and more of their resources in improving their CSR 
performance. In 2002, the mean ESG Score for these 15 countries was 53.21 and in 2017 it was 
66.71. The country with the highest ESG Score by 2017 is France with a score of 75.05 and 




Figure 3 – This figure depicts the evolution of the ESG Scores between 2002 and 2017 for all countries in the sample. The 
thick line represents the mean of the sample. 
 
On Figure 4, the ESG scores for 2017 are represented per country. This visual representation 
allows to better understand the CSR environment in Europe. It becomes clear that central 
Europe outperforms the rest of its peers in terms of CSR performance. France, Germany, Spain 
and the Netherlands, with the inclusion of Sweden, are the top performers of the group.  
Figure 4 – Map representing the average ESG Score per country in 2017. This figure is composed from the ESG scores 





































In Table 1, the relationship between the independent variable, the ESG Score, and the dependent 
variables, the financial performance indicators (ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q) is tested. Table 4 
shows the empirical results of the regressions. 
Assessing the t-statistics for the regressions (1) and (4), that is, those with Return on Assets 
(ROA) as the dependent variable, the independent variable ESG Score and the control variables 
ln (Book Value of Assets), Debt on Assets and ln (Sales) are all statistically significant at the 
1% level, meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected. For the regressions (2) and (5), where 
Return on Equity (ROE) is used as dependent variable, again, the variables ESG Score and the 
logarithms of Book Value of Assets and Sales are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
However, the variable Debt on Assets does not have any statistical significance. Lastly, for 
equations (3) and (6), that is, when using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable, the independent 
variable ESG Score and the control variables ln (Book Value of Assets), Return on Assets 
(ROA) are all statistically significant at the 1% level. The control variable Sales Growth is the 
only exception, as it does not have any statistical significance in both regressions. 
Subsequently, analyzing the coefficients, in all equations it is demonstrated that the overall ESG 
Score is positively related with financial performance, represented by ROA and ROE and firm 
value, characterized by Tobin’s Q. These results support the existing literature, which states 
that a good CSR performance is associated with higher financial results. Regarding the control 
variables, most of them display the expected signs. Risk, measured by the Debt per Assets ratio 
affects the dependent variables negatively and firm size, represented by ln Sales displays a 
positive relationship with financial performance and Return on Assets have a positive impact 
on firm value. However, ln Book Value of Assets has a negative relationship with all dependent 
variables. 
The results concerning the second set of regressions are shown in Table 5. Here, the impact of 
the dummy variables High ESG Score and Low ESG Score is estimated against the financial 
indicators, again Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. 
Starting with the t-statistics, for equations (1) and (4), when ROA is employed as the dependent 
variable, the independent variable High ESG Score is significant at the 1% level in equation (1) 
and at the 5% level in equation (4). The other independent variable, the dummy Low ESG Score 




level, except for the log of Sales used in equation (4), which is not statistically significant. For 
equations (2) and (5), High ESG Score is significant at the 5% level and, again, Low ESG Score 
does not add statistical significance to the model. All control variables are significant at the 1% 
level except for Debt on Assets in both equations. In both equations (3) and (6), the dummy 
variable High ESG Score is statistically significant at the 1% level and, on the other hand, the 
dummy Low ESG Score does not show any statistical significance, as such, its impact on firm 
value cannot be evaluated. The remaining control variables show statistical significance at the 
1% level except for the variable Sales Growth. 
The outputs obtained show that higher ESG Scores are positively associated with firm 
performance indicators, Return on Assets and Return on Equity, as well as with firm value. This 
supports the theory that the firms that are top performers in CSR are able to achieve higher 
financial results than those that do not put as much effort and resources pursuing CSR activities. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis that companies with extremely low ESG Scores, that is, firms 
whose score is lower than 20, are associated with lower financial results and inferior firm values 
is not confirmed. As for the control variables, the results are the same as before. Once again, ln 
of the Book Value of Assets and Debt on Assets display a negative sign and all other control 
variables display a positive relationship with the dependent variables. 
Finally, as this study means to investigate the individual relationship between each ESG pillar 
(Environmental, Social and Governance) and financial performance, a third regression is run 
using the individual scores as the independent variables. The results are displayed in Table 6. 
Evaluating the t-statistics of equations (1) and (4), the variable Environmental Score is not 
statistically significant in either equation, the variable Social Score is significant at the 1% level 
and the Governance Score variable is statistically significant at the 5% level in equation (1) and 
not significant in equation (4). All the control variables in both equations are significant at the 
1% level. When using ROE as the dependent variable, the results vary a little, as in equation 
(2), all the independent and control variables are statistically significant at the 1% level, except 
for the ratio Debt/Assets. However, in equation (5), the Governance Score does not have any 
statistical significance at all for the model. Lastly, in equation (3), Environmental and Social 
Scores are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, and on the other hand, 
Governance Score is not significantly linked with firm value. The control variables are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level, only Sales Growth does not hold any significance at all. 




Governance Score shows no model significance. Only the logarithm of Book Value of Total 
Assets and Return on Assets show any statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Regarding the outputs, the individual Environmental Score is negatively related with both 
Return on Equity and Tobin’s Q. This could support Gray and Shadbegian’s (1993) theory that 
using the company’s resources towards environmental projects and values could hurt overall 
productivity. Regarding the individual Social Score, the results show a positive relationship 
across all equations, meaning that high social values are ultimately beneficial to the 
organization. Finally, Governance Score demonstrates a positive relation with both ROA and 
ROE, when not controlling for country fixed-effects, in equations (1) and (2). Of the three 
pillars, the Social one is the most impactful on both financial performance and firm value. The 
control variables show the same relationships as the previous two tables. 
Another purpose of this research is to investigate how Corporate Social Responsibility is 
perceived in each European country and its local impact. 
Tables 7 through 9 use the same regressions as before, only now each country is assessed 
individually. Assessing Table 7, which uses Return on Assets as the dependent variable, the 
results for the ESG Score are, overall, corresponding to the ones observed before in Table 4, 
that is, a positive relationship between ESG Score and Return on Assets. However, of the 15, 
only 6 countries depict a significant result, those are Germany, Greece and Switzerland, with a 
1% significance, the United Kingdom and Sweden, with a level of 5% statistically significance, 
and Ireland, with a 10% level of significance. Greece and Ireland are the only countries that 
show a negative relationship between CSR and financial performance (proxied by ROA). It is 
to note that these two are in bottom five CSR performers in the country sample of this research 
and below the European average, being Ireland the worst performer of the 15 countries. This 
could explain the low levels of investment in CSR activities in those countries, as maybe 
companies perceive that it would only influence negatively their profits and results and prefer 
to invest their resources in other activities. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that this could be 
explained by other unobservable variables cannot be excluded. There could exist other factors 
that make firms perform badly while not investing in CSR as well, as is the case of a bad firm 
management. It is insightful to mention that those countries at the top of the ESG rank are the 
one whose result show a positive relationship between CSR and firm performance. The 
individual pillars are in accordance with the previous results. The Environmental score affects 




the Environmental Score, ROA increases 0.03. France is the country whose companies have 
the highest ESG score of the sample. As it is the country with highest CSR values, this positive 
relationship could be explained by the high standards of French society regarding 
environmental values. The costs of improving environmental efficiency could be overcome by 
the gains in societal approval, among other benefits. Regarding the impact of the Social Score, 
only Belgium, Denmark and Norway depict statistically significant results. Norway is the 
country where socially responsible initiatives have the most impact, as a 1-point increase in the 
Social Score results in a 0.21 point increase in return on assets. Finally, and according with 
previous studies (Bird et al., 2007; Dimson et al., 2013; Edmans, 2008), Governance aspects 
are the most relevant in respect to ROA. This score has a 1% statistical significance in Germany, 
Finland, Italy, France, Denmark and Norway. Sweden shows significance at the 5% level. This 
pillar shows the most mixed results, as it has a positive impact in countries such as Germany, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden, but shows a negative relationship with ROA in Italy, France and 
Denmark. At the extremes lies Norway with a positive coefficient of 0.129 and Denmark with 
a negative coefficient of -0.114.  
Table 8 shows the impact of the four scores on Return on Equity for each of the 15 European 
countries. Once again, the results do not differ much. Finland and Greece deviate from the norm 
regarding the coefficients for the ESG Score as the impact on ROE in those countries is 
negative. Once again, the countries at the top of the table regarding ESG scores, that is, 
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, demonstrate positive relationships. As 
for the three pillars, again, the environmental factor is associated with lower Return on Equity 
for most of the countries, with the exception of Finland. The Social Score and the Governance 
are positively associated with ROE for the majority of the countries. 
Lastly, regarding the relationship between firm value (Tobin’s Q) and CSR for each of the 15 
countries, the results can be observed in Table 9. Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland, once again, show a positive relationship between the overall ESG Score and firm 
value. Only the coefficient of the ESG Score for French companies correlates negatively with 
Tobin’s Q. Regarding the other three scores, and the environmental one in particular, only 
Germany and Ireland depict a significant relationship between the Environmental Score and 
Tobin’s Q, both at the 1% level. In the case of the German firms, the relationship is negative, 
as for the Irish, companies that perform better in environmental aspects can increase their value. 
Companies that partake in social initiatives in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and in the 




to Belgium companies, whose firm value will decrease by 0.07 points, when their Social Score 
increases by 1. Once again, the Governance Score’s impact is not homogeneous across the 
countries. On one hand, there is a positive relationship among German, Finnish, British, Swiss 
and Swedish firms, and on the other, companies in Italy, France and Norway seem to decrease 
value as the Governance Score increases. 
The reason behind the limited amount of countries with significant results could be explained 
by the size of the sample. Due to inexistence of data available, most of the countries do not 
























5. Further analysis on policy shifts 
 
For further exploration of the results achieved, we will look in more depth at a particular period 
in the sample. We focus on what happened after 2011, which was the year that both the 
European Council and the European Parliament joined forces with the European Commission 
to further develop its CSR policy. By the end of 2011, in the Single Market Act, a new 
communication on CSR was adopted. In its renewed EU 2011-14 strategy, the Commission 
carried out several voluntary “policy measures and binding rules with its directives on non-
financial reporting and public procurement”. With this strategy, the European Commission 
aspires to boost the visibility of CSR, the sharing of best practices and to improve the 
companies’ ability to regulate themselves. 
For this purpose, the regressions for the whole sample will be estimated with a new set of 
independent variables. A dummy variable AFTER is introduced which corresponds to 1 for the 
years after 2011. The new dependent variables correspond to the previous ones used multiplied 
by the dummy AFTER. 
Analyzing the results in Table 10, the variable AFTER*ESG is not significant for the 
regressions estimating ROA without country dummies and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, these results 
seem to suggest that nothing changed after 2011. However, concerning the regressions 
estimating ROE, the variable AFTER*ESG is significant at the 1% level. This could mean that 
something has indeed changed after 2011. 
In Table 11, the variables AFTER*HighESGscore, except for the results of the regressions 
estimating Tobin’s Q, and AFTER*LowESGscore do not show significant outputs, suggesting, 
again that nothing changed after 2011. But for the regressions with Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable, the results are again different. 
Finally, in Table 12, the dummy variables created, AFTER*Env.Score, AFTER*SocialScore 
and AFTER*Gov.Score, are statistically significant for the majority of the regressions. The 
relationship between the pillars and the dependent variables shifted after 2011. Only the 
relationship between Social Score and Tobin’s Q and the link between Governance Score and 
ROA remain unchanged. 
Analyzing these results, the successfulness of the changes made by the European Commission 
in 2011 is not very clear. The results suggest that the overall relationship between CSR and firm 




succeeded in changing the link between the environmental and social pillars and company 
performance. The most successful outcome is that, from 2011 onwards, Environmental 



























Despite the findings and conclusions reached, this dissertation has still space to improve due to 
the presence of some limitations in the research. 
The first major limitation is that, although a conditional correlation between variables is found, 
the causality of the relationship is left to be established. A conclusion cannot be reached if, 
indeed, corporate social responsibility performance leads to better financial results and 
increased firm value, or if causality goes the other way, and bigger firms with more resources 
are those that can invest more in CSR and obtain better results in their ESG scores. 
Another drawback in this study, is that CSR is a much wider concept that includes many other 
topics. Therefore, there are other variables that can be included to better determine how the 
firms perform in CSR aspects. Future studies could also further investigate the 400 measures 
collected by Thomson Reuters, to see which particular activities show the most significant and 
impactful relationships. Following the same logic, there are other ways as well to assess firm 
performance and firm value that are not included in this dissertation. As for the control 
variables, there are many others that could be included such as the percentage of investment in 
R&D, which is an important variable to take into account for these types of studies (McWilliams 
et al., 2000). However, due to the low number of observations, the variable was ultimately 
excluded from the sample. 
One final limitation worth mentioning is the size of the sample. As the ESG Scores measure is 
















This paper contributes to the existing literature concerning the relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and a firm’s financial performance and value. The main purpose of this 
research is to add new valuable findings to the field, specifically, on the European context. In 
order to do so, data from companies from 15 European countries is analyzed. An important 
differentiation factor regarding this paper is the employment of Thomson’s Reuters ESG Scores 
and the study of the three pillars of CSR individually. 
Regarding the results, it can be inferred that there is a positive relationship between CSR and 
financial performance in European countries, from an accounting perspective. Companies with 
high socially responsible values achieve higher Return on Assets and Return on Equity ratios. 
As is the case with profitability ratios, Corporate Social Responsibility performance and firm 
value are positively correlated, however the relationship between the ESG Score and firm value 
is not as economically meaningful as it is on ROA and ROE. 
Another main conclusion of this research is that as the ESG Score increases so do the financial 
performance indicators. Companies with higher scores are associated with higher financial 
results, that is, those with an ESG Score above 80 outperform their peers with lower ESG scores 
in terms of financial results. The contrary cannot be said, extreme low ESG scores don’t seem 
to have a relevant influence on corporate financial performance. 
Regarding the study of three individual pillars of ESG, the results show that not all three have 
the same relationship with financial performance and firm value. The Environmental Score, 
contrary to what would be expected, is negatively associated with ROE and Tobin’s Q. The 
Social Score is the only score that is positively connected with all financial performance and 
firm value variables. Finally, the Corporate Governance Score has a positive relationship with 
both ROA and ROE, however, it does not have a relevant relationship with Tobin’s Q. 
However, most of these results, for the exception of the relationships between Social Score and 
Tobin’s Q and between Governance Score and ROA, did not pass the robustness test conducted. 
Nonetheless, this is relevant information for managers as they need to understand which CSR 
activities will be the most impactful and advantageous to undertake, in order to design the best 
strategy possible for their companies. Recalling that managers must focus on the CSR activities 
that create the most synergy between the social objectives of society and the companies’ 
economic objectives (Carroll et al., 2010), according to results obtained, these activities are the 




and improve the community around them, respect human rights, that offer opportunities to 
minorities, that produce ethically and do not employ slave labor, among many other activities 
are those that are, generally, positively associated with higher returns.  
At a country level, countries in central Europe are the top performers of the sample and are 
those that demonstrate better positive links between CSR performance and firm financial 
performance/value. 
In conclusion, managers are encouraged to implement CSR activities into their company’s 
strategy. The world is expecting more and more out of companies and they need to behave 
accordingly. The CSR mindset is here to stay and will continue to shape the business 
environment, thus, as soon as companies start to get involved, the sooner they can reap its 

























Table 1 – Weights attributed to each CSR category. 
Category Weight 




Human Rights 0.045 
Community 0.08 
Product Responsibility 0.07 
Management 0.19 
Shareholders 0.07 
CSR Strategy 0.045 
 
Table 2- List of Variables. This Table introduces and defines all the dependent, independent and control variables used in the 
research. 
Variables Abbreviation Description 
Return on Assets ROA Ratio of Net Income per Total Assets 
Return on Equity ROE Ratio of Net Income per Total Equity 
Tobin's Q it Q Tobin’s Q, at time t for each company i 
ESG Score ESG Total ESG score 
High ESG Score HiESG Dummy variable which will be equal to 1 if the total ESG 
score ≥ 90 and 0 otherwise. 
Low ESG Score  LoESG Dummy variable which will be equal to 1 if the total ESG 
score ≤ 20 and 0 otherwise. 
Environmental Score ENV Score awarded for Environmental performance 
Social Score SOC Score awarded for Social performance 
Governance Score GOV Score awarded for Governance performance 
Log of Total Assets lnASSETS The logarithm of the book value of Total Assets 
Debt on Assets DEpAS Ratio of Total Debt per Total Assets 
Log of Total Sales lnSALES Logarithm of Total Sales 
Sales Growth SGROW Ratio of Current Year's Net Sales or Revenues per Last Year's 
Total Net Sales 
Α  The intercept term 
Β  Coefficient 




Γ  A vector of coefficients 
ε  The error term 
 
Table 3 - Summary Statistics. The sample consists of firm-year observations from 2002 to 2017. All data is retrieved from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. The variables are winsorized at 1% tails. The sample includes all firms with non-missing 
observations for the years and variable below. 
Variable N Mean Median SD Kurtosis Skewness Min Max P25 P75 
ESG Score 4000 62.44 63.94 15.00 2.66 -0.37 16.74 96.23 52.66 73.33 
ENV Score 4000 74.87 87.77 25.13 3.21 -1.24 8.39 97.42 63.51 93.26 
SOC Score 4000 75.52 85.67 23.71 3.62 -1.28 3.84 99.37 63.89 93.4 
GOV Score 4000 59.86 65.18 25.90 2.21 -0.52 1.49 97.96 40.4 82.49 
ROA 4000 6.08 5.42 18.55 10.66 -0.13 -53.22 34.38 2.32 9.07 
ROE 3696 13.52 13.58 18.55 14.34 -1.52 -108.9 69.34 6.90 20.97 
Tobin's Q 3936 0.91 0.65 0.93 13.75 2.75 0.01 6.70 0.35 1.13 
ln(Sales) 4000 15.54 15.51 1.58 2.57 -0.07 10.00 19.70 14.39 16.74 
Sales Growth 3696 16.76 4.41 624.37 3683.7 60.64 -83.19 37938 -1.64 11.86 
ln(BV Assets) 4000 16.13 15.89 1.75 2.97 0.56 12.03 21.56 14.81 17.24 
Debt on Assets 4000 0.27 0.25 0.16 3.56 0.61 0 1.14 0.15 0.37 
 
Table 4 - The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses from the regressions of ROA, 
ROE and Tobin’s Q on the overall ESG Score. All regressions include Year Dummies and, where indicated, Country Dummies 
as well. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
  ROA (1) ROE (2) Tobin's Q (3) ROA (4) ROE (5) Tobin's Q (6) 
ESG Score 0.038*** 0.106*** 0.008*** 0.036*** 0.099*** 0.008*** 
 (4.87) (4.92) (8.52) (4.59) (4.43) (8.65) 
ln(Book Value of Assets) -1.809*** -3.004*** -0.15*** -1.778*** -2.919*** -0.180*** 
 (-17.53) (-11.48) (-20.04) (-16.75) (-10.98) (-22.32) 
Debt on Assets -4.868*** -2.99  -4.424*** -2.618  
 (-7.45) (1.52)  (-6.68) (-1.30)  
ln(Sales) 0.733*** 2.294***  0.822*** 2.599***  
 (-6.39) (7.47)  (6.86) (8.09)  
ROA   0.072***   0.069*** 
   (40.72)   (39.76) 
Sales Growth   0   0 
   (-0.63)   (-0.57) 
Constant 22.812*** 20.66*** 2.521*** 22.226*** 17.352*** 2.917*** 
 (21.23) (7.08) (21.12) (17.61) (5.08) (21.35) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4000 3872 3664 4000 3872 3664 
Number of firms 250 242 229 250 242 229 
F-test 11.82 13.4 6.29 12.26 13.56 6.98 







Table 5 - The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses from the regressions of ROA, 
ROE and Tobin’s Q on the dummies High ESG Score and Low ESG Score. All regressions include Year Dummies and, where 
indicated, Country Dummies as well. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** 
and *, respectively. 
  ROA (1) ROE (2) Tobin's Q (3) ROA (4) ROE (5) Tobin's Q (6) 
High ESG Score 2.35*** 5.373** 0.423*** 2.224** 5.647** 0.339*** 
 (2.61) (2.30) (4.17) (2.51) (2.43) (3.42) 
Low ESG Score -0.048 -8.170 -0.166 -0.295 -8.516 -0.054 
 (-0.02) (-1.04) (-0.52) (-0.10) (-1.08) (-0.18) 
ln(Book Value of Assets) -1.752*** -2.819*** -0.133*** -1.712*** -2.750*** -0.158*** 
 (-17.04) (-10.88) (-18.37) (-16.28) (-10.46) (-20.63) 
Debt on Assets -4.72*** -2.549  -4.314*** -2.236  
 (-7.19) (-1.29)  (-6.49) (-1.11)  
ln(Sales) 0.779*** 2.439***  0.867 2.728***  
 (6.80) (7.97)  (7.25) (8.52)  
ROA   0.073***   0.069*** 
   (40.95)   (39.93) 
Sales Growth   0   0 
   (-0.59)   (-0.55) 
Constant 23.317*** 21.865*** 2.627*** 22.345*** 17.797*** 2.954*** 
 (21.61) (7.46) (21.76) (17.64) (5.19) (21.36) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4000 3872 3664 4000 3872 3664 
Number of firms 250 242 229 250 242 229 
F-test 11.4 12.74 7.13 11.83 12.97 8.09 

















Table 6 - The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses from the regressions of ROA, 
ROE and Tobin’s Q on the three individual pillars of ESG. All regressions include Year Dummies and, where indicated, 
Country Dummies as well. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. 
  ROA (1) ROE (2) Tobin's Q (3) ROA (4) ROE (5) Tobin's Q (6) 
Environmental Score -0.003 -0.046*** -0.001** -0.005 -0.050*** -0.002*** 
 (-0.61) (-2.78) (-2.10) (-0.79) (-2.97) (-2.80) 
Social Score 0.019*** 0.079*** 0.006*** 0.025*** 0.092*** 0.006*** 
 (2.92) (4.39) (8.94) (3.85) (4.94) (8.61) 
Governance Score 0.012** 0.046*** -0.001 -0.005 0.012 0 
 (2.48) (3.49) (-2.48) (-0.91) (0.76) (0.63) 
ln(Book Value of Assets) -1.713*** -2.827*** 0.152*** -1.659*** -2.665*** -0.175*** 
 (-16.88) (-10.97) (-19.77) (-15.86) (-10.15) (-21.61) 
Debt on Assets -5.145*** -4.309**  -4.632*** -3.670*  
 (-7.88) (-2.20)  (-7.01) (-1.83)  
ln(Sales) 0.641*** 2.124***  0.730*** 2.383***  
 (5.41) (6.64)  (5.91) (7.17)  
ROA   0.072***   0.068*** 
   (41.07)   (39.94) 
Sales Growth   0   0 
   (-0.84)   (-0.76) 
Constant 23.267*** 22.140*** 2.646*** 22.730*** 19.294*** 2.968*** 
 (21.49) (7.55) (22.28) (17.92) (5.62) (21.95) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4096 3968 3744 4096 3968 3774 
Number of firms 256 248 234 256 248 234 
F-test 11.08 12.56 6.33 11.68 12.62 6.83 












Table 7 - The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses from the regression of ROA 
on the overall ESG Score and the three individual pillars. The results are shown by country. All regressions include Year 
Dummies. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
 ESG Score Environmental Score Social Score Governance Score 
  # Firms Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Belgium 10 -0.041 (-1.19) -0.095*** (-3.52) 0.051* (1.74) -0.023 (-1.02) 
Germany 23 0.063*** (3.25) -0.067*** (-4.14) 0.022 (1.13) 0.068*** (4.43) 
Finland 11 0.005 (0.15) -0.023 (-1.20) -0.012 (-0.52) 0.059*** (2.95) 
Italy 15 -0.010 (-0.68) 0.01 (0.84) 0.007 (0.50) -0.043*** (-4.01) 
Netherlands 14 0.045 (1.55) 0.025 (1.33) 0.022 (0.67) 0.002 (0.10) 
Spain 14 0.005 (0.16) -0.024 (-0.68) 0.04 (1.11) -0.036 (-1.38) 
Austria 4 -0.064 (-1.37) -0.019 (-0.89) 0.009 (0.34) -0.028 (-1.40) 
France 31 -0.019 (-1.20) 0.030** (2.16) 0.012 (0.77) -0.031*** (-3.58) 
Greece 6 -0.093*** (-2.70) -0.027 (-0.69) 0.013 (0.29) -0.016 (-0.51) 
Ireland 5 -0.119* (-1.90) -0.085** (-2.34) 0.045 (1.09) -0.034 (-0.96) 
Denmark 9 0.082 (1.12) -0.061 (-0.76) 0.139** (2.13) -0.114*** (-2.75) 
Norway 5 0.021 (0.19) -0.165*** (-4.01) 0.210*** (3.57) 0.129*** (2.84) 
UK 55 0.052** (2.31) -0.014 (-0.81) 0.029 (1.56) 0.018 (1.00) 
Switzerland 25 0.062*** (3.13) 0.017 (0.92) 0.012 (0.66) 0.012 (0.62) 
Sweden 23 0.057** (2.16) 0.018 (1.06) 0 (0.00) 0.036** (2.19) 
 
 
Table 8 - The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses from the regression of ROE on 
the overall ESG Score and the three individual pillars. The results are shown by country. All regressions include Year Dummies. 
The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
 ESG Score Environmental Score Social Score Governance Score 
  # Firms Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Belgium 10 0.072 (0.64) -0.330*** (-3.60) 0.282*** (2.83) 0.043 (0.57) 
Germany 23 0.144** (2.25) -0.134** (-2.17) 0.005 (0.08) 0.153*** (2.86) 
Finland 11 -0.163* (-1.94) 0.121** (-2.13) -0.003 (-0.05) 0.115** (2.21) 
Italy 15 0.107* (1.85) 0.016 (0.36) 0.046 (0.81) -0.106*** (-2.58) 
Netherlands 14 -0.041 (-0.48) 0.022 (0.40) -0.166* (-1.68) 0.07 (1.00) 
Spain 14 -0.107 (-1.06) -0.085 (-0.76) 0.014 (0.13) 0.002 (0.02) 
Austria 4 -0.173 (-0.99) -0.205*** (-2.81) 0.125 (1.30) -0.028 (-0.40) 
France 31 -0.054 (-0.96) -0.090* (-1.80) 0.194*** (3.97) -0.050 (-1.56) 
Greece 6 -0.319* (-1.92) -0.166 (-0.86) 0.243 (1.12) -0.187 (-1.15) 
Ireland 5 -0.058 (-0.64) -0.149** (-2.11) 0.055 (0.74) 0.067 (0.81) 
Denmark 9 0.244 (1.59) -0.108 (-0.68) 0.243* (1.81) -0.104 (-1.28) 
Norway 5 -0.192 (-0.80) -0.468*** (-4.03) 0.350** (2.35) 0.359*** (2.77) 
UK 55 0.120* (1.87) 0.012 (0.26) 0.114** (2.10) 0.044 (0.91) 
Switzerland 25 0.179*** (3.67) 0.064 (1.40) 0.026 (0.59) 0.032 (0.76) 






Table 9 - The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses from the regression of Tobins’ 
Q on the overall ESG Score and the three individual pillars. The results are shown by country. All regressions include Year 
Dummies. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
 ESG Score Environmental Score Social Score Governance Score 
  # Firms Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Belgium 10 0.005 (1.37) 0.003 (1.23) -0.007*** (-3.80) 0 (0.05) 
Germany 23 0.011*** (3.93) -0.023*** (-8.29) 0.012*** (4.37) 0.012*** (6.01) 
Finland 11 0 (-0.09) -0.005 (-1.05) 0.003 (0.56) 0.010*** (3.00) 
Italy 15 0.002 (1.21) 0 (0.11) 0.001 (0.70) -0.03** (-2.18) 
Netherlands 14 0.003 (0.84) -0.007 (-1.59) 0.010*** (2.67) 0.001 (0.23) 
Spain 14 -0.002 (-0.22) -0.006 (-0.51) 0.016 (0.32) -0.003 (-0.53) 
Austria 4 -0.002 (-0.35) -0.003 (-0.73) 0.006 (0.78) 0.005 (1.32) 
France 31 -0.007** (-2.16) -0.002 (-0.71) 0.001 (0.25) -0.007*** (-4.74) 
Greece 6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ireland 5 0.013** (2.54) 0.008*** (3.22) 0.005 (1.28) -0.001 (-0.27) 
Denmark 9 0.023 (1.62) 0.014 (0.93) 0.008 (0.58) -0.005 (-0.68) 
Norway 5 -0.006 (-0.65) -0.009 (-1.36) 0.013** (2.11) -0.010* (-1.91) 
UK 55 0.012*** (4.21) 0 (-0.11) 0.004* (1.91) 0.004* (1.85) 
Switzerland 25 0.008** (2.37) 0.003 (0.79) -0.003 (-0.71) 0.007** (2.16) 




















Table 10 – Robustness Test. The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses from the 
regressions of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q on the dummy AFTER*ESG and the overall ESG Score. The significance of 1, 5 and 
10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
  ROA (1) ROE (2) Tobin's Q (3) ROA (4) ROE (5) Tobin's Q (6) 
AFTER*ESG 0.016 0.068*** 0.00 0.018* 0.081*** -0.001 
 (1.58) (2.61) (-0.02) (1.79) (2.95) (-0.68) 
ESG Score 0.032*** 0.079*** 0.008*** 0.029*** 0.066*** 0.008*** 
 (5.05) (3.63) (11.82) (4.35) (2.95) (12.92) 
ln(Book Value of Assets) -1.810*** -3.004*** -0.155*** -1.780*** -2.919*** -0.180*** 
 (-15.93) (-8.47) (-19.93) (-12.70) (-787) (-18.66) 
Debt on Assets -4.878*** -2.991*  -4.431*** -2.603  
 (-6.64) (-1.88)  (-6.13) (-1.41)  
ln(Sales) 0.731 2.282***  0.822*** 2.595***  
 (4.25) (6.31)  (3.81) (5.53)  
ROA   0.072***   0.069*** 
   (13.75)   (12.63) 
Sales Growth   0.00***   0.00*** 
   (-6.82)   (-6.44) 
Constant 22.793*** 20.563*** 2.521*** 22.216*** 17.223*** 2.917*** 
 (16.43) (6.31) (22.07) (13.84) (4.58) (18.41) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4000 3872 3664 4000 3872 3664 
Number of firms 250 242 229 250 242 229 
F-test 269.57 52.65 161.63 - - - 


















Table 11 - Robustness Test. The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses from the 
regressions of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q on the dummies AFTER*HighESGscore, AFTER*LowESGscore, and the dummies 
High ESG score and Low ESG score. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** 
and *, respectively. 
  ROA (1) ROE (2) Tobin's Q (3) ROA (4) ROE (5) Tobin's Q (6) 
AFTER*High ESG Score 1.353 -2.366 0.288** 2.441* 0.815 0.552*** 
 (1.18) (-0.76) (2.16) (1.83) (-0.24) (4.49) 
AFTER*Low ESG Score 1.852 -15.903 -0.027 0.555 -19.331 -0.004 
 (1.14) (-1.03) (-0.19) (0.33) (-1.24) (-0.01) 
High ESG Score 1.335* 7.156*** 0.218*** 0.386 6.254*** -0.069 
 (1.90) (3.90) (2.61) (0.46) (3.15) (-0.90) 
Low ESG Score -0.788 -1.811* -0.155** -0.521 -0.730 -0.054 
 (-1.08) (-1.65) (-2.32) (0.67) (-0.49) (0.17) 
ln(Book Value of Assets) -1.745*** -2.806*** -0.133*** -1.715*** -2.737*** -0.158*** 
 (-15.44) (-8.24) (-21.94) (-12.22) (-7.51) (-19.79) 
Debt on Assets -4.721*** -2.558  -4.311*** -2.257  
 (-6.36) (-1.55)  (-5.90) (-1.18)  
ln(Sales) 0.781*** 2.430***  0.872*** 2.718***  
 (4.69) (5.96)  (4.14) (5.83)  
ROA   0.073***   0.069*** 
   (13.98)   (12.94) 
Sales Growth   0.00***   0.00*** 
   (-6.08)   (-5.84) 
Constant 23.321*** 21.808*** 2.627*** 22.326*** 17.819*** 2.953*** 
 (16.13) (6.60) (25.54) (13.47) (4.57) (20.73) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4000 3872 3664 4000 3872 3664 
Number of firms 250 242 229 250 242 229 
F-test 174.93 18.51 211.32 - - - 














Table 12 - Robustness Test. The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses from the 
regressions of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q on the dummies AFTER*Env. Score, AFTER*Social Score, AFTER*Gov. Score, 
and the independent variables Environmental score, Social score and Governance score. The significance of 1, 5 and 10 per 
cent of the coefficients are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
  ROA (1) ROE (2) Tobin's Q (3) ROA (4) ROE (5) Tobin's Q (6) 
AFTER*Env. Score 0.056*** 0.160*** 0.005*** 0.052*** 0.150*** 0.005*** 
 (3.93) (3.68) (3.54) (3.62) (3.39) (3.36) 
AFTER*Social Score -0.034*** -0.106*** 0.001 -0.032*** -0.101*** 0.000 
 (-2.72) (-3.01) (0.45) (-2.62) (-3.02) (-0.32) 
AFTER*Gov. Score 0.005 0.059*** -0.004*** 0.011 0.070*** -0.003*** 
 (0.41) (3.43) (-4.75) (1.00) (4.00) (-3.94) 
Environmental Score -0.019*** -0.087*** -0.003*** -0.018*** -0.088*** -0.003*** 
 (-2.81) (-7.42) (3.35) (-2.68) (-7.49) (-3.57) 
Social Score 0.029*** 0.113*** 0.006*** 0.035*** 0.124*** 0.006*** 
 (3.11) (4.99) (8.36) (3.69) (5.24) (8.34) 
Governance Score 0.010 0.020 0.000 -0.009 -0.018 0.002** 
 (1.47) (1.54) (0.56) (-1.41) (-1.39) (2.22) 
ln(Book Value of Assets) -1.723*** -2.845*** 0.154*** -1.669*** -2.690*** -0.177*** 
 (-15.58) (-9.13) (-21.78) (-12.40) (-8.18) (-18.44) 
Debt on Assets -5.068*** -4.225***  -4.599*** -3.685**  
 (-7.38) (-2.83)  (-6.85) (-2.17)  
ln(Sales) 0.636*** 2.083***  0.724*** 2.355***  
 (3.59) (5.16)  (3.19) (4.84)  
ROA   0.071***   0.068*** 
   (13.69)   (12.81) 
Sales Growth   0.00***   0.00*** 
   (-8.10)   (-7.54) 
Constant 23.078*** 21.417*** 2.643*** 22.508*** 18.393*** 2.970*** 
 (17.47) (6.27) (24.25) (13.82) (4.57) (18.34) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4096 3968 3744 4096 3968 3744 
Number of firms 256 248 234 256 248 234 
F-test 314.77 88.63 118.48 - - - 
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Table 13 – Correlation Matrix 
  ESG ENV SOC GOV ROA ROE Q lnASSETS DEpAS lnSALES SGROWTH 
ESG 1.00           
ENV 0.65 1.00          
SOC 0.71 0.70 1.00         
GOV 0.58 0.46 0.48 1.00        
ROA -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 1.00       
ROE 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.80 1.00      
Q -0.00 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.63 0.40 1.00     
lnASSETS 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.22 -0.26 -0.09 -0.37 1.00    
DEpAS -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.17 -0.08 -0.29 0.06 1.00   
lnSALES 0.36 0.39 0.46 0.19 -0.12 0.01 -0.17 0.80 -0.10 1.00  
SGROWTH -0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.15 0.15 0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
 
 
Table 14 - Countries' average ESG Score and mean of the whole sample. 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
France 58.87 58.14 61.9 64.5 66.15 67.24 67.06 70.04 
Germany 55.22 55.23 57.1 56.52 57.39 60.01 63 64.48 
Spain 56.17 54.45 58.48 60.05 59.49 63.43 69.57 72.16 
Sweden 51.33 51.82 56.79 58.81 56.54 58.84 62.15 64.83 
Netherlands 60.16 58.06 59.71 62.47 62.28 65.14 67.42 68.94 
Italy 51.26 50.13 54.13 54.61 54.08 58.1 62.03 63.59 
United 
Kingdom 56.93 58.09 62.21 58.23 59.93 61.03 62.14 62.87 
Switzerland 54.05 54.25 56.97 60.1 60.35 59.96 60.76 62.64 
Austria 55.75 53.66 57.26 53.32 49.57 48.71 48.32 51.2 
Finland 58.06 57.41 61.76 56.35 58.38 52.45 55.61 57.98 
Greece 45.06 50.68 56.7 56 51.63 55.86 61.28 66.24 
Norway 53.26 55.79 56.78 56.73 59.57 61.19 58.65 60.77 
Denmark 49.54 47.47 49.03 44.65 46.87 47.66 52.07 54.74 
Belgium 49.47 50.26 53.77 55.9 52.32 52.59 55.55 55.75 
Ireland 43 38.14 45.44 44.92 39.84 35.54 38.74 42.08 







Table 15 – Continuation of Table 14 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
France 70.67 71.64 69.95 70.14 70.44 73.36 74.55 75.07 
Germany 68.68 70.31 70.29 70.7 71.72 72.44 72.57 72.98 
Spain 70.24 71.48 69.37 70.28 70.82 72.55 72.71 72.64 
Sweden 67.07 67.53 67.33 66.71 65.79 68.96 71 71.18 
Netherlands 71 70.95 66.11 70.46 70.4 70.94 71.41 71.01 
Italy 64.33 67.36 65.15 65.54 66.65 68.4 69.49 71 
United 
Kingdom 64.23 65.87 65.7 65.07 65.62 68.72 69.22 69.21 
Switzerland 62.87 64.39 65.08 65.4 66.14 66.9 67.24 69.17 
Austria 57.54 56.07 55.7 55.9 57 57.94 62.66 67.66 
Finland 59.24 59.76 58.46 58.54 58.79 63.48 65.67 66.85 
Greece 64.95 66.09 66.32 64.29 62.96 65.69 66.03 65.52 
Norway 61.09 61.79 62.2 60.31 56.74 61.19 61.97 63.64 
Denmark 55.38 59.08 57.33 58.55 58.22 60.3 58.88 59.12 
Belgium 56.87 55.9 54.41 53.69 52.2 54.02 52.76 55.43 
Ireland 43.54 45.71 47.71 44.99 43.91 50.32 50.84 50.17 
Mean 62.5133 63.5953 62.7407 62.7047 62.4933 65.014 65.8 66.71 
 
 
